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Ofsted aŶd ChildreŶ͛s Serǀices: What PerforŵaŶce IŶdicators aŶd Other Factors Are Associated 
with Better Inspection Results? 
 
David Wilkins
 
and Vivi Antonopoulou 
 
Abstract  
͚FailiŶg͛ aŶ iŶspeĐtioŶ of The OffiĐe foƌ StaŶdaƌds iŶ EduĐatioŶ, ChildƌeŶ͛s SeƌǀiĐes aŶd Skills ;OfstedͿ 
has severe consequences on a local authority. Senior managers may lose their jobs and the 
workforce as a whole can be destabilised. In extreme cases, central government can decide whether 
the authoƌitǇ is Ŷo loŶgeƌ Đapaďle of ƌuŶŶiŶg ĐhildƌeŶ͛s seƌǀiĐes. OŶ the otheƌ haŶd, ƌeĐeiǀiŶg 
positive Ofsted judgements often brings with it a national reputation for excellence. This study 
reports the findings of an analysis of key performance indicators, expenditure and deprivation in 
relation to Ofsted inspections for eighty-seven local authorities in England undertaken between 
2014 and 2016. Our aim was to examine the association between these factors and Ofsted 
judgements. Our findings suggest that for most of the factors we considered, there is no clear 
pattern of better or worse performance between local authorities with different Ofsted ratings. 
Hoǁeǀeƌ, ͚good aŶd outstaŶdiŶg͛ authoƌities teŶd to outpeƌfoƌŵ other authorities in relation to 
some procedural variables. By itself, the level of local authority deprivation was most clearly 
assoĐiated ǁith the Ofsted ƌatiŶg, aŶd eǆpeŶdituƌe ǁas assoĐiated ǁith the authoƌitǇ͛s leǀel of 
deprivation but not their Ofsted judgeŵeŶt. CoŵpaƌisoŶs aƌe ŵade ǁith the ĐoŶĐept of ͚ǀalue-
added͛ peƌfoƌŵaŶĐe iŶ ƌelatioŶ to sĐhools.  
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Introduction  
The OffiĐe foƌ StaŶdaƌds iŶ EduĐatioŶ, ChildƌeŶ͛s SeƌǀiĐes and Skills (Ofsted) is responsible for the 
iŶspeĐtioŶ of ĐhildƌeŶ͛s seƌǀiĐes iŶ EŶglaŶd. The aiŵ of these iŶspeĐtioŶs is to ͚ƌaise staŶdaƌds aŶd 
iŵpƌoǀe liǀes͛ ;Ofsted, ϮϬϭϰ, p. ϱͿ. Yet, iŶ the past Ofsted haǀe ďeeŶ ĐƌitiĐised foƌ foĐusiŶg too ŵuĐh 
on coŵpliaŶĐe ǁith poliĐies aŶd pƌoĐeduƌes aŶd Ŷot eŶough oŶ ͚the eǆpeƌieŶĐes of ĐhildƌeŶ, ǇouŶg 
people aŶd theiƌ faŵilies͛ ;MuŶƌo, ϮϬϭϭ, p. ϳͿ. IŶ ƌespoŶse to these ĐƌitiĐisŵs, Ofsted ƌeǀised theiƌ 
inspection framework to focus more on the quality of practice and outcomes for children and less on 
compliance. Under this new frame- ǁoƌk, Ofsted iŶspeĐted ĐhildƌeŶ͛s seƌǀiĐes aĐƌoss thƌee aƌeas—
Child Protection (CP), Looked After Children (LAC) and Leadership—and provided an overall 
judgeŵeŶt of ͚iŶadeƋuate͛, ͚ƌeƋuiƌes iŵpƌoǀeŵeŶt͛, ͚good͛ oƌ ͚outstaŶdiŶg͛. UŶdeƌ this fƌaŵeǁoƌk, 
it has pƌoǀed ŵoƌe diffiĐult foƌ loĐal authoƌities to aĐhieǀe a gƌade of ͚good͛ oƌ ͚outstaŶdiŶg͛ thaŶ 
ďefoƌe. IŶ Ofsted͛s ϮϬϭϲ aŶŶual soĐial Đaƌe ƌepoƌt, the ŵost ƌeĐeŶtlǇ puďlished ǁithiŶ the time 
frame considered for this article (2014– 2016), of the eighty-seven authorities inspected, 2 per cent 
;Ŷϭ⁄ϰϮͿ ǁeƌe gƌaded outstaŶdiŶg, Ϯϰ peƌ ĐeŶt ;Ŷϭ⁄ϰϮϭͿ ǁeƌe gƌaded good, ϰϵ peƌ ĐeŶt ;Ŷϭ⁄ϰϰϯͿ ǁeƌe 
graded as requiring improvement and 24 per cent ;Ŷϭ⁄ϰϮϭͿ ǁeƌe fouŶd to ďe iŶadeƋuate. This 
compares with 9 per cent outstanding, 69 per cent good and 22 per cent adequate in 2007/2008, 
during which year no authorities were rated inadequate (Impower, 2015).  
 
This ŵaǇ suggest that ͚the ďaƌ has ďeeŶ ƌaised͛ foƌ ĐhildƌeŶ͛s seƌǀiĐes aŶd Ǉet it has also ďeeŶ aƌgued 
that these judgements do not take sufficient account of local deprivation and spending levels 
(Rowlands, 2010; Bywaters et al., 2014a,b; Jones, 2015a). In 2015, the government announced that 
when childƌeŶ͛s seƌǀiĐes aƌe judged to ďe ͚iŶadeƋuate͛, theǇ Đould ďe suďjeĐt to ŵaŶdatoƌǇ 
intervention by the Department for Education (DfE) (HM Government, 2015). In some places, such 
as DoŶĐasteƌ aŶd Slough, ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ foƌ the pƌoǀisioŶ of ĐhildƌeŶ͛s seƌǀices has been removed 
from the local authority. Even in less extreme circumstances, it remains the case that the impact of a 
negative Ofsted judgement can still be problematic—͚ĐoŶfideŶĐe ... is lost, thƌesholds ďeĐoŵe ǀeƌǇ 
low ... the workforce implodes and becomes unstable ... there is a heavy dependence on agency 
workers ... workloads increase ... backlogs of assessment build up, cases are unallocated and corners 
aƌe Đut͛ ;JoŶes, ϮϬϭϱďͿ.  
 
Despite the significant influence that Ofsted has on the social care sec- tor (Tilbury, 2004), compared 
ǁith the eduĐatioŶ seĐtoƌ, ǁe kŶoǁ ƌelatiǀelǇ little aďout theiƌ iŶspeĐtioŶs of ĐhildƌeŶ͛s seƌǀiĐes. 
Theƌe haǀe ďeeŶ Ŷuŵeƌous studies of Ofsted͛s sĐhool iŶspeĐtioŶs, iŶĐludiŶg ǁhetheƌ iŶspeĐtioŶs 
help improve exam performance (Rosenthanl, 2004)1, whether they make a difference to General 
Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) results (Shaw et al., 2003)2, how schools behave before 
and after an inspection (Ouston et al., 1997)3 aŶd ǁhetheƌ Ofsted͛s judgeŵeŶts aƌe reliable 
(Campbell and Husbands, 2000)4. IŶ ƌelatioŶ to ĐhildƌeŶ͛s seƌǀiĐes, faƌ less has ďeeŶ puďlished. 
Notable exceptions include a Local Government Association report into whether Ofsted inspections 
help iŵpƌoǀe ĐhildƌeŶ͛s seƌǀiĐes ;Iŵpoǁeƌ, ϮϬϭϱͿ. This report found that when a department is 
judged to ďe ͚iŶadeƋuate͛ oƌ ͚iŶ Ŷeed of iŵpƌoǀeŵeŶt͛, theǇ teŶd to suffeƌ ͚aŶ aĐĐeleƌated deĐliŶe͛ 
(2015, p. 3).  
                                                     
1 No—in the year of inspection, exam performance was slightly worse than in other years. 
2 For a small number of schools, inspection was associated with slight improvements. For the majority of schools, inspection did not 
improve examination achievement. 
3 School inspections were found to contribute positively to the process of school improvement. 
4 The methodology of inspection was found to be insufficiently reliable for the consequences which flow from it. 
 How do Ofsted inspect local authorities?  
We do, however, know what methods Ofsted use when inspectiŶg ĐhildƌeŶ͛s seƌǀiĐes, ďeĐause theiƌ 
iŶspeĐtioŶ haŶdďook is a puďliĐ doĐuŵeŶt ;Ofsted, ϮϬϭϳaͿ. It desĐƌiďes a ͚ĐoŵďiŶatioŶ of Đase-
tƌaĐkiŶg, Đase saŵpliŶg, oďseƌǀatioŶs of pƌaĐtiĐe aŶd iŶteƌǀieǁs͛ ;p. ϮϯͿ. The latteƌ ŵaǇ ďe 
conducted with social workers, children and young people, parents and carers, foster carers and 
adopteƌs aŶd seŶioƌ staff ǁithiŶ the authoƌitǇ. IŶspeĐtoƌs ŵaǇ also speŶd tiŵe ͚shadoǁiŶg staff iŶ 
their day-to-daǇ ǁoƌk͛ aŶd ͚oďseƌǀiŶg pƌaĐtiĐe iŶ ŵulti-ageŶĐǇ/siŶgle ageŶĐǇ ŵeetiŶgs͛ ;p. 24). This 
suggests that Ofsted aim to take a holistic approach by gathering data from a variety of sources and 
theŶ seekiŶg to ͚tƌiaŶgulate [the] eǀideŶĐe͛ ;p. ϯϮ aŶd p. ϯϱͿ. This appƌoaĐh has ďeeŶ ďoth Đoŵ- 
ŵeŶded aŶd ĐƌitiƋued ďǇ MuŶƌo ;ϮϬϭϰͿ ǁho said, ͚the new framework is looking at the right aspects 
of ǁoƌk͛ ;p. ϭͿ ďut ͚the ĐoŵpliĐated Đausal liŶks ďetǁeeŶ pƌofessioŶal pƌaĐtiĐe aŶd outĐoŵes ŵake it 
diffiĐult to ŵake judgeŵeŶts aďout ĐausalitǇ͛ ;p. ϮͿ. IŶ otheƌ ǁoƌds, although the iŶspeĐtioŶ 
framework sets out what Ofsted inspectors do, it is not clear how they use this data to form a 
judgement about causal links between what they observe about the service and the quality of 
practice and resultant outcomes.  
 
What factors are associated with different Ofsted judgements?  
The ƋuestioŶ of ǁhat faĐtoƌs aƌe ŵost stƌoŶglǇ assoĐiated ǁith Ofsted͛s judgŵeŶts is ĐƌitiĐal. To 
date, we are aware of only one other published study that explored this question in relation to 
Ofsted͛s Ŷeǁ iŶspeĐtioŶ fƌaŵeǁoƌk. La Valle et al. (2016, p. 21) looked at eleven performance 
variables (mostly related to children in care) and found no significant associations between 
improved performance and better Ofsted judgements. Indeed, two of the best performing 
authorities—Lambeth and Sandwell— ǁeƌe judged ďǇ Ofsted to ďe ͚iŶadeƋuate͛ ǁhile oŶe of the 
worst performing authorities—East Sussex—ǁas judged to ďe ͚good͛. SiŵilaƌlǇ, iŶ ƌelatioŶ to 
Ofsted͛s pƌeǀious iŶspeĐtioŶ fƌaŵeǁoƌk, Hood et al. ;ϮϬϭϲͿ eǆaŵiŶed all ϭϱϮ loĐal authoƌities iŶ 
EnglaŶd aŶd fouŶd thƌee ǀaƌiaďles pƌediĐted aŶ ͚iŶadeƋuate͛ judgeŵeŶt—fewer timely assessments, 
higher re- referral rates and higher proportions of agency workers.  
 
There is a clear need for more research regarding the role of Ofsted in relation to children͛s seƌǀiĐes. 
Such research would help us under- stand more clearly how Ofsted form their judgements and how 
inspection activity might be improved. With this article, we aim to contribute to this debate by 
exploring which of the variables we considered, if aŶǇ, ǁeƌe assoĐiated ǁith Ofsted͛s judgeŵeŶts.  
 
Aims and objectives  
In this study, we sought to address the following questions—(i) What is the association between 
selected local authority performance variables, expenditure, deprivation and Ofsted judgements? 
and (ii) Can these associations explain differences in obtained Ofsted judgements?  
 
Method  
We explored the relationship between a selection of key variables and Ofsted judgements for eighty-
seven English local authorities inspected between 2014 and 2016 (at the time of data collection, this 
represented every authority inspected under that framework). Each of the key variables relates to 
one of three areas—finance and spending, levels of deprivation and performance. All the data are 
publicly available.5 
 
Measuƌes of Ofsted͛s judgeŵeŶts  
Ofsted iŶspeĐtioŶ data foƌ eaĐh loĐal authoƌitǇ ǁeƌe ƌetƌieǀed fƌoŵ Ofsted͛s ǁeďsite. We staƌted ďǇ 
considering the association between the overall Ofsted judgement and each of the sub-category 
judgements (CP, LAC and Leadership). As the correlations were so high, for the rest of our analysis 
we used only the overall Ofsted judgement for each authority (Table 1).  
 
 Ofsted child 
protection 
judgement 
Ofsted looked 
after children 
judgement 
Ofsted 
leadership 
judgement 
Ofsted 
overall 
judgement 
Ofsted overall 
judgement 
.904** .822** .929**  
Ofsted child 
protection 
judgement 
 .694** .883** .904 
Ofsted looked 
after children 
judgement 
.694**  .835 .822** 
Ofsted 
leadership 
judgement 
.883** .835**  .929** 
Taďle 1. SpearŵaŶ͛s rho correlation matrix for Ofsted overall and sub-category judgements. 
**p is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
                                                     
5 Spending, finance and key performance data from the DfE; deprivation data from the Department for Communities and Local 
Government and inspection data from Ofsted. 
We then placed each authority into a category—low, medium or high—depending on their overall 
judgeŵeŶt. LoĐal authoƌities ǁith aŶ ͚iŶadeƋuate͛ judgeŵeŶt ǁeƌe plaĐed iŶto the loǁ ĐategoƌǇ ;Ŷ 
ϭ⁄ϰ ϮϮͿ. LoĐal authoƌities ͚iŶ Ŷeed of iŵpƌoǀeŵeŶt͛ ǁeƌe plaĐed iŶto the ŵediuŵ ĐategoƌǇ ;Ŷϭ⁄ϰϰϰͿ. 
As there were relatively few high-performing authorities at the time of our study, those judged 
͚good͛ oƌ ͚outstaŶdiŶg͛ ǁeƌe plaĐed togetheƌ iŶto the high ĐategoƌǇ ;Ŷ ϭ⁄ϰ ϮϭͿ.  
 
Measures of spending  
Obtaining an accurate estimate of local authority spending is difficult, not least because local 
authorities report spending in different ways (Bywaters et al., 2015, 2017). For this study, we used 
local authority budget returns6 to oďtaiŶ a total speŶdiŶg figuƌe foƌ ĐhildƌeŶ͛s services in the 
financial year of their most recent Ofsted inspection. These figures were adjusted for inflation to 
2015/2016 levels using the retail price index. We divided this figure by the local child population at 
the time of the Ofsted inspection (usiŶg Ofsted͛s figuƌesͿ, ƌesultiŶg iŶ a ͚speŶdiŶg peƌ Đhild͛ estiŵate 
for each authority.  
 
There are clear limitations to this approach, not least because not all authorities report spending 
data in the same way, but authorities target their spending more heavily on some children than 
otheƌs. IŶ additioŶ, although it is ƌelatiǀelǇ easǇ to kŶoǁ hoǁ ŵaŶǇ ͚ĐhildƌeŶ iŶ Ŷeed͛ aŶd ͚ĐhildƌeŶ 
iŶ Đaƌe͛ theƌe aƌe iŶ eaĐh authoƌitǇ, the ďƌeadth of loĐal authoƌitǇ speŶdiŶg oŶ ĐhildƌeŶ aŶd faŵilies 
is far wider, including social work assessments (at least some of which will conclude the child was 
Ŷot ͚iŶ Ŷeed͛Ϳ, eaƌlǇ Ǉeaƌs suppoƌt, ĐhildƌeŶ͛s ĐeŶtƌes aŶd Suƌe Staƌt, Ǉouth seƌǀiĐes aŶd faŵilǇ 
support services. Obtaining reliable usage figures for each of these services in each authority is 
practically very difficult.  
 
Thus, ǁe aĐkŶoǁledge the liŵitatioŶs iŶ ouƌ appƌoaĐh aŶd aĐĐept that a ŶoŵiŶal ͚speŶdiŶg peƌ Đhild͛ 
figure may not represent actual spending patterns (although it is worth nothing that similar figures 
have been used by other researchers in the field; Bywaters et al., 2017).  
Measures of deprivation  
 
Using the English Indices of Deprivation 2015, we ranked each local authority from least deprived 
(Woking) to most deprived (Manchester). Although ranking at the level of local authority obscures 
within- authority variation, as with spending data, this approach provides at least an indication of 
                                                     
6 Under section 251 of the Apprenticeship, Skills, Children and Learning Act 2009, local authorities are required to submit to central government statements about their planned and actual expenditure on education and children’s social care. These statements are 
available via the Department for Education website. 
the relative position of each authority. We re- moved authorities not included in our sample and re-
ranked the remaining authorities from one to eighty-seven.  
 
Key variables in relation to children protection and children looked after  
Finally, we obtained key variables in relation to CP and LAC services for each local authority for the 
year immediately prior to their most recent Ofsted inspection (Table 2).  
 
Children protection – key 
performance indicators  
1. Referral rate per 10,000 
2. Rate of repeat referrals (%) 
3. Assessment rate per 10,000 
4. Assessments overdue (%) 
5. Children in need per 10,000 
6. Initial child protection conferences overdue (%) 
7. Child protection review conferences overdue (%) 
8. Statutory child protection visits overdue (%)  
9. Child in need and child protection plans lasting longer than 2 years (%) 
10. Rate of repeat child protection plans (%) 
Looked after children – key 
performance indicators 
1. Looked after children per 10,000 
2. Looked afteƌ ĐhildƌeŶ ǁithout ϱ oƌ ŵoƌe ͚good͛ GCSEs ;%Ϳ 
3. Looked after children placed more than 20 miles from home (%) 
4. Looked afteƌ ĐhildƌeŶ ͚peƌsisteŶtlǇ aďseŶt͛ fƌoŵ eduĐatioŶ ;%Ϳ 
5. Looked afteƌ ĐhildƌeŶ ǁith a ƌeĐoƌded episode of ͚ŵissiŶg fƌoŵ Đaƌe͛ ;%Ϳ  
Table 2. Details of key performance data obtained for each local authority. 
 
These data were obtained from the DfE website. Some of these indicators relate to procedural 
outputs, thiŶgs ͚pƌoduĐed͛ ďǇ the loĐal authoƌitǇ—e.g. the proportion of assessments completed on 
time or out of time. Some of the indicators relate to the quality of practice or perhaps even child and 
family outcomes— e.g. the rate of repeat referrals and the proportion of children in care who did 
Ŷot aĐhieǀe ͚good͛ GCSE ƌesults. We Đhose these iŶdiĐatoƌs ďased oŶ ouƌ oǁŶ judgeŵeŶt aďout theiƌ 
likely significance, and because many of them are routinely discussed and cited in the wider 
literature (Bilson and Martin, 2017). This means there are inevitably other indicators that we did not 
include but might have—e.g. the number of special guardianship orders). Expenditure and 
deprivation, we considered to be structural variables, related not to procedure or practice but to the 
wider context and environment within which local authorities operate. Table 3 shows the 
peƌĐeŶtage of authoƌities iŶ eaĐh of ouƌ Ofsted Đategoƌies ;͚iŶadeƋuate͛, ͚iŶ Ŷeed of iŵpƌoǀeŵeŶt͛ 
aŶd ͚good aŶd outstaŶdiŶg͛Ϳ Đoŵpaƌed to high-, medium- and low levels of deprivation.  
 
 
 
 Ofsted rating 
Repeat 
Referrals (%) 
Assessments 
Overdue (%) 
LAC with 
missing episode 
(%) 
Levels of 
deprivation  
Spend per 
child 
  Ofsted rating  -.064 -.224* .519** -.245* -.146 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .558 .043 .000 .022 .179 
N  87 82 45 87 87 
 Repeat 
Referrals (%) 
-.064  .089 -.070 -.321** -.045 
Sig. (2-tailed) .558  .427 .649 .002 .678 
N 87  82 45 87 87 
 Assessments 
Overdue (%) 
-.224* .089  -.195 .069 .021 
Sig. (2-tailed) .043 .427  .200 .540 .848 
N 82 82  45 82 82 
 LAC with 
missing 
episode (%) 
.519** -.070 -.195  -.154 .048 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .649 .200  .313 .753 
N 45 45 45  45 45 
 Levels of 
Deprivation  
-.245* -.321** .069 -.154  .655** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .022 .002 .540 .313  .000 
N 87 87 82 45  87 
 Spend per 
child 
-.146 -.045 .021 .048 .655**  
Sig. (2-tailed) .179 .678 .848 .753 .000  
N 87 87 82 45 87  
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Table 3. Statistically significant correlations between Ofsted scores categories and key factors. 
 
Associations between Ofsted judgements and key variables  
SpeaƌŵaŶ͛s ƌho ŶoŶ-parametric correlational analyses were performed to establish the pattern of 
relationships between Ofsted judgements and the key variables we included. Significant correlations 
were found between Ofsted judgements and levels of deprivatioŶ ;SpeaƌŵaŶ͛s Ƌ ϭ⁄ϰ ฀Ϭ.Ϯϰϱ, p ϭ⁄ϰ 
Ϭ.ϬϮϮͿ, the pƌopoƌtioŶ of assessŵeŶts oǀeƌdue ;SpeaƌŵaŶ͛s Ƌ ϭ⁄ϰ ฀Ϭ.ϮϮϰ, p ϭ⁄ϰ Ϭ.ϬϰϯͿ, aŶd the 
pƌopoƌtioŶ of ĐhildƌeŶ iŶ Đaƌe ǁith ͚ŵissiŶg episodes͛ ;SpeaƌŵaŶ͛s Ƌ ϭ⁄ϰ Ϭ.ϱϭϵ, p < Ϭ.ϬϬϭͿ. Taďle ϰ 
depicts the statistically significant associations.  
 
 
Ofsted 
categories 
Repeat referrals (%) CIN plans > 2 years (%) CP plans > 2 years (%) Repeat CP plans (%) 
 N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD 
Inadequate 22 23.2 7.54 22 32.0 8.02 17 2.9 1.84 21 16.0 4.88 
In need of 
improvement 
44 21.7 7.05 44 30.7 6.67 28 2.7 2.60 44 15.0 4.73 
Good and 
outstanding 
21 21.2 5.14 21 33.0 6.69 17 2.1 2.36 21 17.7 5.56 
Total 87 22.0 6.73 87 31.6 7.01 62 2.6 2.34 86 15.9 5.04 
Table 4. Mean scores for Ofsted scores categories and CP ͚praĐtiĐe͛ variaďles. 
 
Comparison of means between Ofsted categories  
We calculated the overall mean between our three Ofsted categories for a selection of key variables. 
Fiƌst, ǁe ĐalĐulated the ŵeaŶ peƌ Ofsted ĐategoƌǇ foƌ a gƌoup of ͚pƌaĐtiĐe͛ variables—repeat 
referrals, Child in Need (CIN) and CP plans lasting longer than two years, repeat CP plans (where the 
same child is subject of a CP plan more than once), children in care persistently absent from school, 
children in care with a missing episode and children in care ǁithout fiǀe ͚good͛ GCSEs. IŶ EŶglaŶd, 
CIN and CP plans are used to coordinate support for children and their families. The key difference 
ďetǁeeŶ theŵ is that CIN plaŶs aƌe used ǁheŶ the Đhild is ͚iŶ Ŷeed͛ of additioŶal suppoƌt and are 
legally voluntary (they cannot be implemented without parental consent), whereas CP plans are 
used when the child is at risk of significant harm and can be implemented (if not entirely effectively) 
without parental consent. For these variables, a lower mean indicates better performance (Tables 5 
and ϲͿ. To take oŶe eǆaŵple, foƌ the gƌoup of ͚iŶadeƋuate͛ authoƌities ǁe ĐoŶsideƌed, theǇ had a 
ŵeaŶ of Ϯϯ.Ϯ peƌ ĐeŶt ƌepeat ƌefeƌƌals. This Đoŵpaƌes ǁith figuƌes of Ϯϭ.ϳ peƌ ĐeŶt iŶ ͚iŶ Ŷeed of 
iŵpƌoǀeŵeŶt͛ authoƌities aŶd Ϯϭ.Ϯ peƌ ĐeŶt iŶ ͚good aŶd outstaŶdiŶg͛ authoƌities. ;The figuƌes foƌ 
standard deviation give an indication of the range of performance in each of these groups.)  
Secondly, we calculated the mean per category for a group of procedural variables — Initial Child 
Protection Conferences and Review Child Protection Conferences overdue, CP visits overdue and 
Assessments overdue. For these variables, a lower mean indicates better performance (Table 7).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ofsted 
Categories  
CLA persistently absent 
from education (%) 
CLA with missing episode 
(%) 
CLA ǁithout 5 ͚good͛ 
GCSEs (%) 
 N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD 
Inadequate 17 6.7 6.14 14 4.8 2.89 13 79.4 6.33 
In need of 
improvement 
29 5.3 1.99 18 6.2 3.19 18 77.5 5.19 
Good and 
outstanding 
16 4.8 1.95 13 9.0 1.78 13 83.3 3.64 
Total 62 5.5 3.63 45 6.6 3.17 44 79.8 5.62 
Taďle ϱ. MeaŶ sĐores for Ofsted sĐores Đategories aŶd CLA ͚praĐtiĐe͛ variaďles. 
 
 ICPCs overdue (%) Review conferences 
overdue (%) 
CP visits overdue (%) Assessments overdue 
(%) 
 N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD 
Inadequate 21 30.1 17.41 22 5.1 5.81 20 39.1 24.85 21 24.4 15.93 
In need of 
improvement 
43 30.5 21.04 44 4.8 5.28 40 44.4 29.68 41 24.2 16.42 
Good and 
outstanding 
18 24.5 15.97 21 2.8 3.67 20 34.4 31.92 20 15.0 9.69 
Total 82 29.1 19.08 87 4.4 5.12 80 40.6 29.09 82 22.0 15.29 
Taďle ϲ. MeaŶ sĐores for Ofsted sĐores Đategories aŶd CP ͚proĐedural͛ variaďles. 
 
 
Ofsted Ranking Deprivation 
levels 
N Mean for 
spending per 
child 
SD 
Inadequate low deprivation 6 734.78 92.82 
 medium 8 850.62 103.75 
 high deprivation 8 981.79 206.73 
Total average    £855.73 134.43 
In need of 
improvement  
low deprivation 10 639.43 102.46 
 medium 15 921.99 157.67 
 high deprivation 19 973.65 204.12 
Total average    £845.02 154.75 
Good and 
outstanding 
low deprivation 
13 658.79 90.82 
 
medium  6 964.88 305.94 
 
high 
deprivation 
2 1102.81 94.83 
Total average  
  £908.82 163.86 
Table 7. Mean spending per child for each OFSTED category and deprivation group. 
 
 
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests were carried out to examine these mean scores and a Bonferroni 
correction was applied when multiple comparisons were made. Significant differences were found 
for two of the variables—the proportion of children in care without fiǀe ͚good͛ GCSEs ;F;Ϯ, ϰϭͿ ϭ⁄ϰ 
ϰ.ϴϲ, p ϭ⁄ϰ Ϭ.Ϭϭϯ, g2 ϭ⁄ϰ Ϭ .ϭϵϴͿ, aŶd the pƌopoƌtioŶ of ĐhildƌeŶ ǁith ͚ŵissiŶg episodes͛ fƌoŵ Đaƌe 
;F;Ϯ, ϰϮͿ ϭ⁄ϰ ϴ.ϭϮ, p ϭ⁄ϰ Ϭ.ϬϬϭ, g2 ϭ⁄ϰ Ϭ.ϮϳϵͿ. Post hoĐ ĐoŵpaƌisoŶs usiŶg BoŶfeƌƌoŶi ĐoƌƌeĐtioŶ 
indicated that the ŵeaŶ sĐoƌe foƌ ĐhildƌeŶ iŶ Đaƌe ǁithout fiǀe GCSEs foƌ the ͚iŶ Ŷeed of 
iŵpƌoǀeŵeŶt͛ ĐategoƌǇ ;Mϭ⁄ϰϳϳ.ϱ, SD ϭ⁄ϰ ϱ.ϭϵͿ ǁas sigŶifiĐaŶtlǇ diffeƌeŶt thaŶ foƌ the 
good/outstaŶdiŶg ĐategoƌǇ ;M ϭ⁄ϰ ϴϯ.ϯ, SD ϭ⁄ϰ ϯ.ϲϯͿ—aǀeƌage peƌfoƌŵaŶĐe iŶ the ͚iŶ Ŷeed of 
improveŵeŶt͛ ĐategoƌǇ ǁas ďetteƌ thaŶ the ͚good/outstaŶdiŶg͛ ĐategoƌǇ. Hoǁeǀeƌ, the ͚iŶadeƋuate͛ 
ĐategoƌǇ ;Mϭ⁄ϰϳϵ.ϰϮ, SD ϭ⁄ϰ ϲ.ϯϯͿ did Ŷot sigŶifiĐaŶtlǇ diffeƌ fƌoŵ the ͚iŶ Ŷeed of iŵpƌoǀeŵeŶt͛ oƌ 
͚good/outstaŶdiŶg͛ Đategoƌies ;p > Ϭ.ϬϱͿ. SiŵilaƌlǇ, post hoĐ Đoŵparisons using Bonferroni correction 
iŶdiĐated that the ŵeaŶ sĐoƌe foƌ ŵissiŶg episodes foƌ the ͚iŶadeƋuate͛ Đate- goƌǇ ;Mϭ⁄ϰϰ.ϳϴ, 
SDϭ⁄ϰϮ.ϴϴͿ aŶd the ͚iŶ Ŷeed of iŵpƌoǀeŵeŶt͛ ĐategoƌǇ ;Mϭ⁄ϰϲ.ϮϮ, SDϭ⁄ϰϯ.ϭϵͿ, ǁeƌe sigŶifiĐaŶtlǇ 
diffeƌeŶt fƌoŵ the ͚good/out- staŶdiŶg͛ ĐategoƌǇ ;M ϭ⁄ϰ ϵ, SD ϭ⁄ϰ ϭ.ϳϴͿ—authorities in the two 
foƌŵeƌ Đategoƌies had feǁeƌ ĐhildƌeŶ ǁith ƌeĐoƌded ͚ŵissiŶg fƌoŵ Đaƌe͛ episodes thaŶ those iŶ the 
͚good/outstaŶdiŶg͛ ĐategoƌǇ.  
 
Ofsted categories and spending  
We calculated the overall mean ͚speŶd peƌ Đhild͛ foƌ ouƌ thƌee diffeƌeŶt Ofsted Đategoƌies. The 
figure for all eighty-seven authorities was £854.60. ANOVA between each of our Ofsted categories 
did not produce any statistically significant differences on expenditure (p > 0.05). When levels of 
deprivation are taken into account, an ANOVA yielded significant differences between local 
authoƌities iŶ teƌŵs of speŶd peƌ Đhild, foƌ the ͚iŶadeƋuate ĐategoƌǇ͛ ;F;Ϯ, ϮϭͿ ϭ⁄ϰ ϰ.ϴϯ, p ϭ⁄ϰ Ϭ.ϬϮͿ; 
for the ͚iŶ Ŷeed of iŵpƌoǀeŵeŶt͛ ĐategoƌǇ ;F;Ϯ, ϰϯͿ ϭ⁄ϰ ϭϯ.Ϯϲ, p ϭ⁄ϰ Ϭ.ϬϬϬͿ; aŶd foƌ the ͚good aŶd 
outstaŶdiŶg͛ ĐategoƌǇ, ;F;Ϯ, ϮϬͿ ϭ⁄ϰ ϵ.ϰϮ, p ϭ⁄ϰ Ϭ.ϬϬϮͿ. Post hoĐ TukeǇ HoŶestlǇ SigŶifiĐaŶt 
Differences (HSD) tests showed that spend per child was significantly different between the low- and 
high- deprivation groups (p < 0 .05); whereas the medium-deprivation group was not significantly 
different from the other two groups (Table 8).  
 
 
 B   CI(95%) P-value 
  Deprivation levels -.031          .014 .970                  (.994,.996)    .026* 
 Assessments 
Overdue 
-.055 .026 .947 (.899,.997)    .037* 
  LAC with missing 
episode  
.583 .190 1.792 (1.235, 2.598)    .002** 
  Total Spend per 
child  
      -.002           .002 .998 (.995, 1.002)    .208 
‘efeƌeŶĐe ĐategoƌǇ ǁas “iŶ Ŷeed foƌ iŵpƌoǀeŵeŶt" Ofsted category.   
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table 8. Bivariate models of Ofsted judgement 
 
Associations with Ofsted category ratings  
Logistic regression analyses were conducted to test the association be- tween all the variables we 
ĐoŶsideƌed aŶd ŵeŵďeƌship of ouƌ thƌee Ofsted Đategoƌies. The leǀel of depƌiǀatioŶ ;B ϭ⁄ϰ ฀0.031, 
Eǆp ď ϭ⁄ϰ Ϭ.ϵϳϬ, p ϭ⁄ϰ Ϭ.ϬϮϲͿ, pƌopoƌtioŶ of assessŵeŶts oǀeƌdue ;B ϭ⁄ϰ ฀Ϭ.Ϭϱϱ, Eǆp ď ϭ⁄ϰ Ϭ.ϵϰϳ, p 
ϭ⁄ϰ Ϭ.ϬϯϳͿ aŶd pƌopoƌtioŶ of ĐhildƌeŶ ǁith ͚ŵissiŶg episodes͛ fƌoŵ Đaƌe ;B ϭ⁄ϰ Ϭ.ϱϴϯ, Eǆp ď ϭ⁄ϰ 
ϭ.ϳϵϮ, p ϭ⁄ϰ Ϭ.ϬϬϮͿ ǁeƌe fouŶd to ďe sigŶifiĐaŶt pƌediĐtoƌs of ŵeŵďeƌship iŶ the ͚good aŶd 
outstaŶdiŶg͛ ĐategoƌǇ ;see Taďle ϵͿ. 
 
 
   B   CI(95%) P-value 
  Full model 16.38 (4) - - - - .003** 
 
Predictors 
      
 Deprivation 
levels 
 -.030          .015         .971 (.944, .999)        .043* 
 Assessments 
Overdue 
 - -.059 .028 .943 (.893,.995) .033* 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table 9.  Multivariate model predicting Ofsted category judgement 
 
 
Spend per child was not found to be associated with Ofsted category judgements (p > 0.05). Thus, 
the odds of a LoĐal AuthoƌitǇ ďeloŶgiŶg to the good/outstaŶdiŶg ĐategoƌǇ ͚deĐƌease͛ ďǇ ϯ peƌ ĐeŶt 
for every deprivation score change of 1, in other words, it becomes 3 per cent less likely to be in the 
good/outstanding category for every increase in deprivation ranking, and 5.3 per cent less likely for 
every change in proportion of assessments overdue. Conversely, it becomes 7.9 per cent more likely 
to be in the good/outstanding category for every change in proportion of reporting children with 
missing episodes of care.  
 
Multivariate regression models were created predicting the Ofsted judgement categories7. Ofsted 
categories were included as the dependent variable in logistic regression models through a stepwise 
process. Only the significant predictors from the univariate regression analysis were included in the 
final model8. The resulting model (v2 ϭ⁄ϰϭϲ.ϯϴ, df ϭ⁄ϰ ϰ, p ϭ⁄ϰ Ϭ.ϬϬϯͿ ĐoŶtaiŶed tǁo pƌediĐtoƌs, 
DepriǀatioŶ ƌaŶkiŶg ;B ϭ⁄ϰ ฀Ϭ.ϬϯϬ, Eǆp ď ϭ⁄ϰ Ϭ.ϵϳϭ, p ϭ⁄ϰ Ϭ.ϬϰϯͿ aŶd assessŵeŶts oǀeƌdue ;B ϭ⁄ϰ 
฀Ϭ.Ϭϱϵ, Eǆp ď ϭ⁄ϰ Ϭ.ϵϰϯ, p ϭ⁄ϰ Ϭ.ϬϯϯͿ, aŶd eǆplaiŶed appƌoǆiŵatelǇ ϮϬ.ϳ peƌ ĐeŶt of the ǀaƌiaŶĐe iŶ 
the Ofsted judgement categories (Cox and Snell r2 ϭ⁄ϰ Ϭ.ϭϴϭ, Nagelkerke r2 ϭ⁄ϰ Ϭ.ϮϬϳͿ ;Taďle ϭϬͿ. 
Thus, it would be 2.9 per cent less likely for a Local Authority to belong to the good/outstanding 
group for every deprivation score change and similarly, 5.7 per cent less likely for every change in 
the proportion of assessments overdue.  
 
 
   B   CI(95%) P-value 
  Full model 16.38 (4) - - - - .003** 
 
Predictors 
      
 Deprivation 
levels 
 -.030          .015         .971 (.944, .999)        .043* 
 Assessments 
Overdue 
 - -.059 .028 .943 (.893,.995) .033* 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table 10.  Multivariate model predicting Ofsted category judgement 
 
 
Strengths and limitations  
The key limitations of our study are (i) the lack of reliable local authority spending data, (ii) the use 
of authority-level deprivation data and (iii) missing data from some local authorities.  
8 The variable children in care with a missing episode from care was not included in the final model 
because it was a variable with data provided for by only half of the sample (i.e. forty-four Local 
Authorities) and therefore, it would limit the parameter estimates in the model.  
 
                                                     
7
 Ordinal regression analyses were first performed on the data but because the assumptions were violated, multinomial logistic 
regressions were then performed.  
8 The variable children in care with a missing episode from care was not included in the final model because it was a variable with 
data provided for by only half of the sample (i.e. forty-four Local Authorities) and therefore, it would limit the parameter estimates 
in the model. 
First, the spending data we used is likely not entirely accurate. Different local authorities report their 
spending in different ways and while we have tried to take account of those differences when 
ĐalĐulatiŶg ͚speŶd peƌ Đhild͛ figuƌes, ǁe iŶeǀitaďlǇ had to ŵake soŵe suďjeĐtiǀe deĐisioŶs. It is 
possible that someone else looking at the same data might arrive at a different figure for at least 
some of the authorities. However, until there exists more accurate and consistent data, the 
approach we used is at least reasonably indicative. It is also a liŵitatioŶ that ouƌ ͚speŶd peƌ Đhild͛ 
figures relate to the overall child population in each authority and not specifically to children 
referred to social services. Having said this, councils do spend money on the whole child population, 
for example, via community projects, and some of this investment is intended to prevent families 
from needing more specialist services. Secondly, our deprivation data relates to entire local 
authority areas. This approach masks within-authority variation (Bywaters et al., 2014a). As with the 
spending data, this means a degree of caution is warranted when interpreting our findings. Thirdly, 
not all local authorities provided a complete set of data to the DfE regarding the key variables we 
used. For example, only forty- four of the eighty-seven authorities provided data on the number of 
ĐhildƌeŶ iŶ Đaƌe ǁith fiǀe oƌ ŵoƌe ͚good͛ GCSEs.  
 
FiŶallǇ, it is iŵpoƌtaŶt to ďe Đleaƌ aďout ouƌ use of the ǁoƌd ͚pƌediĐtoƌ͛ iŶ this ĐoŶteǆt. We did Ŷot 
undertake a longitudinal study, so we are not making any claims about prediction in the sense of 
future performance. Rather, knowing the deprivation level of the local authorities included in this 
study allowed us to predict their membership of the different Ofsted categories we used but no 
causal relationship is implied, and our analyses were not intended to test or confirm causality.  
Strengths of the study include the relatively large number of local authority variables we considered 
(fifteen in total) and the combination of performance, practice or outcome, spending and 
deprivation data. Finally, the eighty-seven authorities included in the sample represent >50 per cent 
of the total number of authorities in England and thus, the patterns of association we report are 
likely to represent what happens in the remaining authorities as well.  
 
Discussion  
We examined the relationship between a range of key local authority variables, levels of spending, 
levels of deprivation and Ofsted judgements. It would be reasonable to hypothesise that authorities 
with better Ofsted judgements would consistently outperform authorities with worse Ofsted 
judgements, at least for some of these variables if not for all of them. For example, one might expect 
that ͚good aŶd outstaŶdiŶg͛ authoƌities haǀe loǁeƌ ƌates of re-referral and repeat CP plans than 
other authorities—ďut iŶ the saŵple ǁe ĐoŶsideƌed, theǇ did Ŷot. Hoǁeǀeƌ, ͚good aŶd outstaŶdiŶg͛ 
authorities did outperform other authorities in terms of procedural compliance, for example, having 
fewer overdue assessments, CP visits and CP conferences.  
 
It is important to note that Ofsted do not claim to base their judgements on the variables we have 
considered in this article—and there is no suggestion by us (or by anyone else) that they should. A 
reliance on easily-measured performance indicators has been roundly criticised within the 
profession (Wastell et al., 2010) and our findings indicate that Ofsted judgements do not, in any 
case, correlate clearly with key performance data. However, this finding is itself confusing. If Ofsted 
ǁeƌe ͚solelǇ͛ foĐused oŶ peƌfoƌŵaŶĐe, authoƌities ǁho held ŵoƌe ŵeetiŶgs oŶ tiŵe ŵight 
consistently achieve better judgements—and we did not find this to be the case. But on the other 
haŶd, if Ofsted ǁeƌe ͚solelǇ͛ foĐused oŶ outĐoŵes, perhaps those authorities in which children in 
care achieved better school performance would consistently achieve better judgements (at least in 
relation to their looked after children services)— but we did not find this to be the case either.  
In relatioŶ to speŶdiŶg, oŶe ŵight hǇpothesise that ͚good aŶd out- staŶdiŶg͛ authoƌities siŵplǇ 
outspeŶd otheƌ authoƌities. IŶ faĐt, fƌoŵ aŶ iŶitial ĐoŶsideƌatioŶ of ͚faĐe ǀaliditǇ͛, ouƌ figuƌes suggest 
that higher per- foƌŵiŶg authoƌities ;͚good aŶd outstaŶdiŶg͛Ϳ actually spend less money per child 
thaŶ uŶdeƌpeƌfoƌŵiŶg authoƌities ;͚iŶ Ŷeed of iŵpƌoǀeŵeŶt͛ oƌ ͚iŶadeƋuate͛Ϳ. This fiŶdiŶg eĐhoes aŶ 
eaƌlieƌ judgeŵeŶt ďǇ the NatioŶal Audit OffiĐe ;ϮϬϭϲͿ that theƌe is ͚Ŷo ĐoƌƌelatioŶ ďetǁeeŶ loĐal 
authoƌities͛ speŶdiŶg oŶ ĐhildƌeŶ iŶ Ŷeed aŶd the ƋuaŶtitǇ aŶd ƋualitǇ of theiƌ seƌǀiĐes͛ ;p. ϮϲͿ. 
Hoǁeǀeƌ, ǁheŶ ǁe Đoŵpaƌed ŵeaŶ speŶd peƌ Đhild foƌ leǀels of depƌiǀatioŶ ͚ǁithiŶ͛ eaĐh Ofsted 
ĐategoƌǇ, it ďeĐaŵe Đleaƌ that ͚good aŶd outstaŶdiŶg͛ authoƌities do speŶd ĐoŶsideƌaďly more when 
they have higher levels of deprivation and much less when they have lower levels of deprivation 
thaŶ authoƌities iŶ the ͚iŶadeƋuate͛ oƌ the ͚iŶ Ŷeed of iŵpƌoǀeŵeŶt͛ Đategoƌies.  
 
Of all the variables we considered, we found only one that by itself predicted membership of the 
͚good aŶd outstaŶdiŶg͛ ĐategoƌǇ. The ŵoƌe depƌiǀed the authoƌitǇ, the ŵoƌe likelǇ it ǁas to ďe 
judged ͚iŶ Ŷeed of iŵpƌoǀeŵeŶt͛ oƌ ͚iŶadeƋuate͛ aŶd the less depƌiǀed the authoƌitǇ, the ŵoƌe likelǇ 
it ǁas to ďe judged ͚good aŶd outstaŶdiŶg͛. Although soŵe of the otheƌ ǀaƌiaďles ǁe ĐoŶsideƌed 
have some individual predictive power, the level of deprivation is the only variable to retain 
predictive power when combined with other variables. Recently, Ofsted themselves have be- come 
aware of this potential relationship, stating in their latest annual re- poƌt, ͚We haǀe ďeguŶ lookiŶg at 
these [data] and we found some correlation between the level of deprivation in the area and overall 
effeĐtiǀeŶess͛ ;ϮϬϭϳď, p. ϳϬͿ. This ƌepƌeseŶts aŶ appaƌeŶt shift fƌoŵ the pƌeǀious Ǉeaƌ͛s ƌepoƌt, iŶ 
ǁhiĐh it ǁas stated that ͚iŶadeƋuaĐǇ is Ŷot a fuŶĐtioŶ of size, depƌiǀatioŶ oƌ fuŶdiŶg ;Ofsted, ϮϬϭϲ, 
p. 5, emphasis added). Ofsted say they will publish the results of their own investigations regarding 
the relationship between performance and deprivation in early 2018.  
 
Another approach?  
When evaluating the performance of secondary schools, the DfE take into account that different 
sĐhools haǀe diffeƌeŶt pupil iŶtakes. TheǇ do so ďǇ ĐalĐulatiŶg the ͚ǀalue added͛ ďǇ eaĐh sĐhool, 
assessing the progress made by pupils from key stage two (Year 6) to key stage four (Year 11). This 
approach recognises that although all pupils can make progress, some pupils experience more 
disadvantage. Thus, achieving good outcomes is more difficult for some schools than for others. It 
also recognises that such difficulties are not directly related to the quality of teaching, important 
though this is. For example, pupils in school A achieve better GCSE results at key stage four than 
pupils in school B. But pupils in school B make greater progress between key stage two and key stage 
fouƌ thaŶ pupils iŶ sĐhool A. As a ƌesult, sĐhool B ǁill haǀe a higheƌ ͚ǀalue added͛ sĐoƌe thaŶ sĐhool 
A. AĐĐoƌdiŶg to the DfE, this ͚ǀalue added͛ ŵeasuƌe is the ďest iŶdiĐatioŶ of a sĐhool͛s oǀeƌall 
effectiveness.  
 
Hoǁeǀeƌ, ŵeasuƌiŶg the peƌfoƌŵaŶĐe of ĐhildƌeŶ͛s seƌǀiĐes is ŵuĐh ŵoƌe diffiĐult thaŶ ŵeasuƌiŶg 
the performance of schools (Malley and Fernandez, 2010; Forrester, 2017). Pupils can be asked to 
take standardised exams, not only at GCSE and A-level but theoretically at any point in their school 
career. The results of these tests can be compared at local, regional, national and even international 
leǀel. EǀaluatiŶg the peƌfoƌŵaŶĐe of ĐhildƌeŶ͛s services is much more complicated. When a child 
comes into care, this might represent the best possible outcome for a child who would otherwise 
experience significant harm at home with their family. Or it might represent a failure on the part of 
ĐhildƌeŶ͛s services—and on the part of society as a whole—to adeƋuatelǇ suppoƌt the Đhild͛s faŵilǇ. 
This complexity may explain why for so long the sec- tor has relied on measuring things that are easy 
to count, such as the number of assessments completed on time, rather than the things that really 
matter but which are harder to quantify, such as the quality of those assessments.  
 
Conclusion  
Much of the publicly available data provided by local authorities to the DfE relates not to the quality 
of practice or outcomes for children but to the output. In the past, Ofsted inspections have been 
criticised for being overly concerned with compliance and insufficiently focused on the quality of 
practice and outcomes. In the time since we completed our analysis for this article, Ofsted (2017a) 
published a revised inspection framework and explicitly identified the need to strike a balance 
between a rigorous and objective inspection and the need to help authorities im- prove rather than 
risk hindering their progress (Schooling, 2017). It would no doubt make for an interesting future 
analysis to consider a new set of inspection judgements and how they relate to an even broader set 
of performance indicators.  
 
Understanding whether ;aŶd hoǁͿ ĐhildƌeŶ͛s seƌǀiĐes aƌe of suffiĐieŶt ƋualitǇ is a keǇ ƋuestioŶ foƌ 
children, families, professionals and policy- makers. Yet it is important not to ignore the importance, 
significance and influence of wider social factors too. As Bywaters et al. (2015, 2017) have found, 
there is a strong relationship between deprivation and intervention rates and large inequities 
between ethnic categories. It is almost inconceivable that this relationship would not also be 
apparent within the pattern of Ofsted judgements across the country. No one is suggesting we 
should loǁeƌ ouƌ aspiƌatioŶs foƌ ĐhildƌeŶ͛s seƌǀiĐes, oƌ that high depƌiǀatioŶ should offeƌ aŶ easǇ 
excuse for poor practice. Yet, it is undoubtedly the case that the well-being and welfare of children 
aŶd theiƌ faŵilies do Ŷot ƌesult siŵplǇ fƌoŵ the ƋualitǇ of help pƌoǀided ďǇ ĐhildƌeŶ͛s seƌǀiĐes. Put 
simply, providing effective help for children and families is harder when levels of deprivation are 
high—and a holistic inspection regime should take this into account.  
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